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RECENT CASES
Antitrust-Agency Franchise Agreements Are
Reasonable Trade Restraints Under Sherman Act
While Restraints Following Sale Are
Per Se Unlawful
The United States sought to enjoin defendant Arnold, Schwinn &
Company's bicycle distribution system as an unlawful restraint of
trade under section 1 of the Sherman Act.' Presumably to revitalize
its declining market position and to meet the challenge of the increased sales activities of giant retailers, 2 Schwinn had introduced the
challenged distribution system. It was composed of three separate
plans: under the first arrangement the bicycles were sold outright
to the wholesalers; the second plan consisted of sales to retailers under
agency or consignment arrangements; and under the third arrangement, designated the "Schwinn Plan," the defendant shipped directly
to retailers, extended credit to and collected from the retailers, and
paid a commission to the distributor who took the order. Under each
arrangement, the franchised wholesalers and retailers were subject to3
territorial and customer restrictions on their distribution practices.
The Government contended that these restrictions significantly reduced intrabrand competition. The defendant argued that the anticompetitive effect on intrabrand competition was reasonable in that
it promoted more vigorous interbrand competition. 4 The district court
held that the territorial limitations, but not the customer restraints,
respecting products sold outright by Schwinn to distributors and
retailers were unlawful per se, but that the restrictions regarding
consignment and agency arrangements were reasonable restraint4 on
trade.5 On direct appeal 6 to the United States Supreme Court, held,
1. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964): "Every contract,
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be

illegal

.

"

2. Schwinn, which in 1951 had the greatest share of the bicycle market-22.5%,
had declined to 12.8% by 1961, largely because of increased sales activities by giant
retailers, which accounted for over 60% of all bicycle sales to consumers in 1961.
Two firms-Sears, Roebuck & Co. and Montgomery Ward & Co.-accounted for 207o%
of all sales.
3. Each retailer was franchised only as to a designated location and was to purchase
only from or through the distributor serving that area. Each retailer was prohibited
from selling Schwinn products to unfranchised dealers. While a franchised dealer was
not prohibited from handling competing brands, the agreement stipulated that Schwinn
bicycles were to be equally promoted with other brands.
4. Schwinn argued that the restraints were ancillary to a reasonable promotion of its
competitive position vis-&-vis other competing brands.
5. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 237 F. Supp. 323 (N.D. I1. 1965).
6. Appeal was brought under § 2 of the Expediting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 29 (1964).
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reversed. Territorial and customer restrictions by a manufacturer on
distributors and retailers incident to consignment or agency agree-ments are lawful where the manufacturer's market position is being
eroded by giant competitors, whereas similar restrictions following sale7
by the manufacturer are per se violations of the Sherman Act.
United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
Although before 1950 courts generally upheld territorial and customer restrictions imposed by manufacturers on their franchises, 8 the
Justice Department began to attack these arrangements on the theory
that such vertical restrictions have the same anti-competitive effects
as concededly unlawful horizontal agreements among dealers and
that therefore they should be declared per se illegal. 9 But the Supreme
Court, in White Motor Co. v. United States,10 seemed unwilling to
accept the Government's position and chose to postpone the matter
until more evidence had been presented.-" There the defendant manufacturer, allegedly to improve its unstable position in the market,
sold its product only to dealers who had signed contracts containing
territorial and customer limitations. The Court noted that under some
circumstances purely vertical territorial and customer restraints which
lead primarily to a lessening of intrabrand competition could be
justified because they would enable the firm to compete more successfully against other firms, whereas purely horizontal restraints which
lead to curtailing of interbrand competition could not.'2 In a con7. The Supreme Court agreed with the district court that vertical territorial and
customer restrictions on distributors and retailers incident to consignment and agency
agreements -were unlawful only if unreasonable, and that vertical territorial restrictions
following outright sale by a manufacturer were per se violations of the Sherman Act,
but added customer limitations incident to an outright sale were also a per se violation.
8. E.g., Cole Motor Car Co. v. Hurst, 228 F. 280 (5th Cir. 1915), aff'd sub noam.
Tillar v. Cole Motor Car Co., 246 F. 831 (5th Cir. 1917), cert. denied, 247 U.S. 511
(1918); Phillips v. Iola Portland Cement Co., 125 F. 593 (8th Cir. 1903), cert. denied,
192 U.S. 606 (1904). The Justice Department relied on a dictum in United States
v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707, 721 (1944): "A distributor of a trademarked article may not lawfully limit by agreement, express or implied, the price at
The same thing is true as
which or the persons to whom its purchaser may resell ....
to restriction of customers." (unlawful price-fixing contaminates entire distribution system
including customer restrictions).
9. There have been numerous consent decrees. E.g., United States v. Rudolph
Wurlitzer Co., 1958 Trade Cas. 1 69,011 (W.D.N.Y.); United States v. J. P. Seeburg
Corp., 1957 Trade Cas. 1168,613 (N.D. Ill.); United States v. Philco Corp., 1956
Trade Cas. f 68,409 (E.D. Pa.).
10. 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
11. "A vertical territorial limitation may or may not have [an anti-competitive]
purpose or effect. We do not know enough of the economic and business stuff out of
which these arrangements emerge to be certain." Id. at 263.
12. Vertical territorial restrictions tend to eliminate competition among distributors
or dealers of a single product within the distributor's or dealer's own area. Since the
particular outlet is protected from competition, it can, once it becomes established,
exercise a substantial amount of monopoly power in the area. Vertical customer restrictions tend to keep prices up by preventing goods from getting into the hands
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curring opinion, Mr. Justice Brennan sought to spell out some of

these circumstances. He suggested that vertical limitations might be
reasonable if the firm were either failing or marketing a risky product
or if it were a new entrant in the market. Since the White Motor
decision, the lower courts have sustained the validity of similar
vertical restrictions. In one case 13 the Sixth Circuit upheld territorial
and customer restrictions of a financially unstable corporation which
allegedly needed the restrictions to induce dealers to market its
products. The Seventh Circuit took a bolder stance in upholding territorial restrictions by an established company, 4 but noted that "bloody

competition" in the market could drive the company out of business.
At the same time that the boundaries of White Motor were being
delineated, manufacturers established agencies and consignment systems with a view to achieving vertical restrictions without violating

the antitrust laws. 15 However, the Supreme Court, in Simpson v.

Union Oil Co.,16 appeared to preclude this approach by indicating that
if the practices violated the antitrust law, they would be enjoined
regardless of the form used.
Speaking for the majority in the instant case, Mr. Justice Fortas

noted that when "a manufacturer parts with title, dominion, or risk

with respect to the article,"1 7 all restrictions-territorial or customerare "in the nature of restraints on alienation '18 and therefore per se
unlawful agreements in restraint of trade. The Court revised the
of discount houses. Yet it may be possible to justify these restrictions. Vertical
restraints may tend to promote competition in the market as a whole, by strengthening one competitor's ability to compete against others (i.e., interbrand competition).
Furthermore, the more nearly identical the products of other brands are, the lesser
the anti-competitive effects on the entire market. In contrast, horizontal restrictionsbeing agreements among manufacturers or dealers to divide markets among themselvestend to cut down on competition between different brands, thus producing an anticompetitive effect on the market as a whole. For an economically oriented study of
.vertical distribution restrictions, see Note, Restricted Channels of Distribution Under
the Sherman Act, 75 HAIv. L. REV. 795 (1962).
13. Sandura v. FTC, 339 F.2d 847 (6th Cir. 1964).
14. Snap-On-Tools v. FTC, 321 F.2d 825 (7th Cir. 1963). Snap-On distributed
through independent, territorially franchised dealers who sold on designated routes
out of mobile, walk-in trucks, most of which were owned by the dealers. When
expensive equipment was desired, Snap-On's salesmen rented or leased the equipment
and made collections for Snap-On. The relationship in this case, then, closely
approximated employment and was probably influential in persuading the Seventh
Circuit to take a bolder stand.
15. The manufacturers relied on dictum in Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337
U.S. 293, 310 (1949): "Before the system of requirements contracts was instituted,
Standard sold gasoline through independent service-station operators as its agents,
and it might revert to this system if the judgment below were sustained."
16. 377 U.S. 13 (1964). Simpson has been followed in a recent case. Cuidry v.
Continental Oil Co., 350 F.2d 342 (5th Cir. 1965).
17. 388 U.S. at 378-79.
18. Id. at 377.
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district court's decree to also include wholesaler restrictions relating
to sold goods, enjoining arrangements which prohibited the resale
of bicycles to unfranchised retailers. 19 But the majority refused to
extend the decree to enjoin all territorial and customer restrictions
however effected. Refusing to apply an inflexible per se standard to
the restrictions effected through agency or consignment, or through
the "Schwinn Plan," Mr. Justice Fortas affirmed the district court's
conclusion that these restrictions on franchised distributors and retailers were reasonable "in view of the competitive problem presented
by 'giant' bicycle retailers." 20 He emphasized that since other reasonably interchangeable brands of bicycles were readily available both
in the market generally and through Schwinn distributors and retailers, interbrand trade was not unreasonably restrained. The
majority concluded that Schwinn's intrabrand restrictions were made
necessary by the competitive situation, went no further than that
situation required, and were designed to promote, rather than hinder,
competition. 21
In reaffirming the distinction drawn in the White Motor case between the anti-competitive effects of vertical and horizontal restrictions, the Court correctly sought to find permissible bounds within
which manufacturers might control the activities of their distributors.
The instant holding sets new criteria for the "reasonableness" of such
control: vertical restraints on agents can be reasonable if the manufacturer's declining position needs a "boost," or if the manufacturer
is trying to protect his "good will" in the face of vigorous competition
from large firms; vertical restraints on independent dealers are never
reasonable. The Court implied that even a failing company or a
new entrant into the market cannot place a restraint on alienation on
the products which it sells rather than consigns to independent
distributors and retailers. On the other hand, companies can impose
vertical restraints on agents even when the company is neither failing
nor a new entrant. Schwinn, though declining, was neither new nor
19. The Court declared that "it is illogical and inconsistent to forbid territorial
limitations on resales by distributors where the distributor owns the goods . . . and,
at the same time, to exonerate arrangements which require distributors to confine
resales of the goods they have bought to 'franchised' retailers." Id.
20. Id. at 376.
21. At the trial, the element of "good will" was crucial to the district court. The
only way Schwinn could compete with giant retailers, to whom it refused to capitulate,
was to develop a reputation of reliable service attached to the Schwinn label. The
district court was persuaded by testimony that Schwinn's pre-1952 distribution program was inefficient and expensive. In part because of this, Schwinn's sales were
declining. Schwinn made a survey of more efficient distributing schemes, which
showed that many of the retail outlets were no longer in existence and that more
than half of the bicycles sold by Schwinn were sold to bicycle shops which provided
parts and reliable service. 237 F. Supp. 323, 337 (1965).
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failing, nor was its product risky.2 Yet its restrictions on its "agents"
were held reasonable. It is unclear, however, why the Court chose
to rely on this agency-sale distinction, thus defining the boundaries
on the basis of a legal relationship which is of limited value for
antitrust purposes. As Mr. Justice Stewart noted in a separate opinion,
dissenting in part, the majority relied more on the district court's
findings than on economic analysis. He also pointed out that Schwinn's
policy of "ensuring that only franchised retailers would be supplied
with its products" was furthered equally under a sales or an agency
agreement. By merely redrafting the agreement, all of Schwinn's
retailers would become "agents" and all the shipments to them would
be "consignments." The record did not show, Mr. Justice Stewart
argued, that the restrictions incident to a sale were more anti-competitive and less justifiable than the "Schwinn Plan" restrictions.2 By
its decision, the Court has opened the possibility of allowing greater
anti-competitive practices under an agency device than had been
allowed before the distinction was made. To do so would lose sight
of the underlying antitrust policy while looking only to a doubtful
technical distinction. A more satisfactory approach would have been
for the Court in the instant case to have followed the White Motor
decision and to have determined the reasonableness of the vertical
restrictions, however effected.

Antitrust-Product Extension Merger in Violation
of Section 7 of the Clayton Act
The Federal Trade Commission challenged the 1957 acquisition of
Clorox Chemical by Procter & Gamble as a violation of section 7
of the Clayton Act.' Prior to the merger, Clorox was the nation's
largest producer of household liquid bleach, accounting for almost
forty-nine per cent of sales in the industry 2 The bleach industry was
22. Although in 1961 Schwinn's share of the market had fallen, its dollar and
unit sales had risen substantially.
23. Mr. Justice Stewart also contended that no previous decision justified the new
application of the per se rule. In fact, he felt that the instant decision overruled tho
White Motor case.
1. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964). The first and principal paragraph reads: "No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part
of the stock or other share capital and no corporation subject to the jurisdiction of the
Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets of another
corporation engaged also in commerce, where in any line of commerce in any section
of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition,
or to tend to create a monopoly."
2. Clorox had been increasing its share of the market almost one per cent annually
since 1953, and after the merger its market share eventually increased to 52%.
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highly oligopolistic, with the six top firms accounting for almost
eighty per cent of market sales. 3 Procter, the largest producer of soap,
detergents and related household products, had assets of over half a

billion dollars, and as the nation's largest advertiser, received sub-

stantial discounts from the various advertising media. 4 The Com-

mission found that the cumulative effects of the merger were a viola-

tion of section 7 of the Clayton Act and ordered divestiture. 5 The
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed. On certiorari to the
United States Supreme Court, held, reversed and remanded. The
acquisition of a smaller company, which produces a functionally

related product 6 and is dominant in its oligopolistic product market,
by a large, diversified firm which had previously been a potential

entrant into the market, may substantially lessen competition and is
thus a violation of section 7 of the Clayton Act. Procter & Gamble

Co. v. FTC, 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
When Congress amended section 7 of the Clayton Act in 1950,
one of its main purposes was to make the law clearly applicable "to
all types of mergers and acquisitions, vertical and conglomerate as
well as horizontal, which have the specified effects of substantially
lessening . . .competition or tending to create a monopoly . . .
3. Entry into small local markets was relatively easy, as the existence of over 200
small firms, few with assets of over $75,000 attests. However, the bleach industry was
deemed oligopolistic because entry into the national and regional markets was
extremely difficult and expensive since a bleach manufacturing plant could only serve
a 300 mile radius economically due to the low price of bleach and large advertising
expenditures which were necessary to successfully market a brand. See note 30 infra
for a discussion of the importance of advertising.
4. In 1957, Procter spent more than $80,000,000 on advertising and an additional
$47,000,000 on sales promotions, and was able to secure 25 to 30% quantity discounts
on its television advertising. It should be noted that Procter no longer secures a discount from the broadcasting networks.
5. In 1960, the hearing examiner ruled against the merger; in 1961, the FTC
remanded the case for post-acquisition evidence; in 1962, the examiner repeated his
finding; and in 1963, the FTC (with only one member remaining from 1961) sustained
the examiner, giving little weight to the post-acquisition evidence. Procter & Gamble
Co., [1963-1965 Transfer Binder] TBADE RFa. REP. ff 16,673. The FTC's opinion
contained 85 citations to 43 economic, social and political writings not in the record,
and included almost all the arguments made by economists that the conglomerate
mergers would damage competition. Procter & Gamble Co. v. FTC, 358 F.2d 74 (6th
Cir. 1966).
6. Packaged detergent, Procter's most important product category, and household
liquid bleach are used complementarily on wash day. Thus, from the consumer's
viewpoint, the two products are closely related. Also, household liquid cleansing agents
in general and household liquid bleach, are generally low-cost, high-turnover consumer
goods marketed chiefly through grocery stores and in large part pre-sold to the consumer
by the mass advertising and sales promotions of the manufacturer. Consequently, the
possibility of significant integration at both the marketing and distribution level arises
since the products are sold to the same customers, at the same stores, and by the same
merchandising methods.
7. H. R.Rm,. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1949).
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In Brown Shoe Co. v. United States8 the Supreme Court viewed this
amendment as indicating a "congressional concern with the protection
of competition, not competitors, and .. . [the congressional] desire
to restrain mergers only to the extent that such combinations may
tend to lessen competition." 9 The Brown Shoe decision'0 was generally
regarded as a determination of the validity of a merger under section
7 by an analysis of all the relevant economic data pertaining to the
12
market situations." In United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank,
the Court reasoned that a "too broad" application of this type of
analysis in cases in which the economic data relating to the structure
of the relevant market is "complex and elusive" may frustrate the
purpose of section 7 and lead to a lack of confidence in business
planning.13 The Court stated that in certain cases the "intense congressional concern with the trend toward concentration warrants dispensing.., with elaborate proof of market structure, market behavior,
or probable anticompetitive effects." The Court held that mergers
producing a firm which has control over an "undue percentage" of
the relevant market and resulting in a significant increase in concentration in the market must be enjoined in the absence of evidence clearly
showing that the merger is not likely to have such anticompetitive
8. 370 U.S. 294 (1962). This was the first case which required extensive analysis
of amended section 7. Only two prior decisions by the Court were based upon
amended section 7, but neither case required an authoritative interpretation of the
section. Jerrold Electronics Corp. v. United States, 365 U.S. 567 (1961), opinion below,
187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960); Maryland & Virginia Milk Producers' Ass'n, Inc.
v. United States, 362 U.S. 458 (1960).
9. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962).
10. Brown controlled 4% of the national market for men's, women's, and children's
shoes. In addition it also controlled some 1230 retail outlets or between 6 and 7%of the
shoe stores in the country. Although Kinney accounted for only 0.5% of domestic shoe
production, this combination made Brown the nation's largest shoe producer, controlling
from 5.1 to 57.7% of the retail market for women's shoes and from 5.1 to 24.8Z of the
mens shoe market, in various communities.
11. Bock, The Relativity of Economic Evidence in Merger Cases-Emerging Decisions
Force the Issue, 63 Micr.L. REv. 1355, 1357 (1963). This approach has been called
the rule-of-reason standard. However, the true rule-of-reason standard employs a caseby-case (ad hoe) analysis of all relevant economic and structural factors with a view
toward the determination of the probable economic consequences of a merger. Comment, Clayton Section 7: A Critical Appraisal of the Supreme Court's Anti-trust-Antibigness Complex in Merger Litigation Since the Brown Shoe Case, 11 WAYNE L. REV.
739, 754 (1965). Although the Brown Shoe approach has merit because of its flexibility,
it requires a wide open record and a heavy drain on court time and the defendant's
finances. In addition, this test fails to indicate the relative weight to be given to each
factor and provides no real degree of predictability. Hrusoff, Conglomerate Mergers,
Joint Ventures, Market Extensions and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 69 Dixm. L. REv.
113 (1965).
12. 374 U.S. 321 (1963). The Court invalidated the merger between the second
and third largest of Philadelphia's 42 commercial banks. The decisive figures were that
30%of the commercial banking business would be obtained by the merging banks, and
59%(up from 44%) by the two largest. Id. at 364-65.
13. Id. at 362.
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-effects.14 Thus, PhiladelphiaNat'l Bank developed a mechanical test
which placed emphasis on market concentration as the key to an
assessment of a merger's validity. This test was applied in United
States v. Aluminum Co. of America' 5 and United States v. Continental
Can Co.,16 where the Court largely ignored the economic evidence
presented by the parties, and concentrated on the structural aspects
of the market.' 7 In United States v. Von's Grocery Co.' the Court
in effect concluded that any merger between large firms in a market
characterized by a continuous trend toward fewer competitors would
be a per se violation of section 7.19 And, in United States v. El Paso
Natural Gas Co.20 the court held that a merger eliminating even a

potential competitor from the market might violate section 7. Two
rules seem to be emerging: first, where concentration is already great,
even slight increases must be prevented; and second, where there is a
strong trend toward oligopoly, further tendencies in that direction are
to be curbed in their incipiency, whatever the number or vigor of the
competitors. 21 Although the Supreme Court has placed increasing if
not decisive weight on the share of the relevant markets controlled
by the acquiring and acquired companies when vertical z2 or hodzontal z mergers are involved, authorities have argued that such an
14. Id. at 363.
15. 377 U.S. 271 (1964). The Court invalidated the acquisition by Alcoa of the
Rome Cable Corporation. Alcoa manufactured aluminum conductor and Rome produced copper conductor.
16. 378 U.S. 441 (1964). The Court declared Continental Can's (the second largest
producer of metal containers) acquisition of the Hazel-Atlas Glass Company (the third
largest producer of glass containers) in violation of section 7.
17. Note, The ABC's of Clayton 7: Amendment of 1950; Brown Shoe; The Court
and Current Complexities, 10 Vim. L. REV. 734, 757 (1965).
18. 384 U.S. 270 (1966). The Court declared the merger of Von's, which had 4.7%'
of the Los Angeles grocery market and ranked third, with Shopping Bag which ranked
sixth with 4.2% invalid. The merger of two major competitors in an industry marked by
a long and continuous trend toward concentration was said to violate section 7 of the
Clayton Act.
19. Some writers have observed that there has been an increasing tendency to find:
a probable lessening of competition whenever there is a possibility of injury to a
competitor. Rill, The Trend Toward Social Competition under Section 7 of the Clayton,
Act, 54 GEo. L.J. 891, 898-99 (1966). Although the Court has repeatedly stated that
it protects competition rather than competitors, its decision in Von's Grocery indicates:
that the Court actually equates an increased number of competitors with increased,
competition.
20. 376 U.S. 651 (1964). The Court overruled the Federal Power Commission'a
approval of the merger of El Paso Natural Gas with Pacific NorthwestPipeline. PacificNorthwest did not operate in California, but it was seeking ways to enter this expanding market. The decision against the merger rested on the fact that there was a good
chance it would enter the market in competition with El Paso.
21. Singer, The Concept of Relative Concentration in Antitrust Law, 52 A.B.A.J.
246, 248 (1966).
22. Vertical merger is defined as an acquisition of the stock or assets of a firm that
buys the product sold by the acquirer or sells a product bought by the acquirer.
23. Horizontal merger is defined as an acquisition by a firm of the stock or assets
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approach would be of little value in determining the validity of a
conglomerate merger under section 7.2 Conglomerates, which have
been defined as including all mergers except horizontal and vertical
mergers, are generally classified into three groups: (1) "pure conglomerates" in which there are no discernible economic relationships
between the business of the acquiring and of the acquired firms; (2)
"market-extension" mergers involving the acquisition of a firm producing the same product as the acquired but selling it in a different
geographic market; and (3) "product-extension" mergers which involve the acquisition of a company manufacturing a different product
which is nevertheless related to a product or products of the acquiring
firm.P The possible anticompetitive effects of conglomerate mergers
have been discussed by numerous economic and legal writers, but
heretofore the Court has not examined the anticompetitive consequences of such mergers."
In the instant case the Court noted that since it is the purpose of
section 7 to arrest anticompetitive effects upon the market in their
incipiency it must be the probability, rather than the actual manifestation of substantial anticompetitive effects of a merger, which
violates section 7. The Court further noted that all mergers, whatever
their nature, are governed by the same standard-the words of section 7. Because these firms were producing functionally related
products, the Court labelled this a "product-extension" merger. The
Court then adopted the reasoning of the Commission in declaring that
Procter's entry into the bleach industry by merger, rather than internal
expansion, presented potential injury to competition in three ways.
The competitive structure of the oligopolistic bleach industry2 may
have been substantially impaired because of the probability that
Procter would become the price leader in the market and that the
oligopoly would thus become more rigid.29 The Court further reaof another firm producing an identical product or close substitute and selling it in the
same geographical market.
24. Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 78 HAv. L.
RPv. 1313, 1316 (1965). Professor Donald F. Turner was appointed Chief of the Antitrust Division of the Department of justice in 1965, and assisted in the preparation of
the government's brief in the instant case.
25. Professor Turner labels "product-extension" and "market-extension" mergers as
mixed conglomerates, and recognizes that the conglomerate grouping contains situations
analytically quite dissimilar. Id. at 1314-15.
26. See note 5 supra.
27. Prior to the decisions in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377 U.S.
271 (1964), and United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441 (1964), it was
generally assumed that these cases involved conglomerate mergers. However, the relevant product market was so defined that the mergers were classified as horizontal
rather than conglomerate; thus making a discussion of conglomerates unnecessary.
28. See note 3 supra.
29. 386 U.S. 568, 576-77 (1967).
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soned that because advertising is so important to the successful
marketing of bleach,30 the merger may serve as a barrier to entry into
the bleach industry, since a new entrant would be much more reluctant
to face the giant Procter, which could divert part of its large advertising budget to meet the short term threat of such an entry. The
Court also stated that the merger would seriously diminish potential
competition by eliminating Procter as a potential entrant into the
bleach industry. The Court reasoned that prior to the merger, Procter
was the most likely entrant into the bleach industry, and absent the
merger would have remained on the periphery as an independent
competitive force, restraining Clorox from exercising its market
power.3 ' Citing Brown Shoe, the Court stated that the possible
economies in advertising and other areas which could have resulted
from the merger were no defense to its potential anticompetitive
effects.32 Thus the Court held that the Commission's decision was
supported by substantial evidence and remanded the case to the court
of appeals for enforcement ofthe Commission's order of divestiture.
Mr. Justice Harlan, concurring, agreed with the criteria utilized by
the Court in reaching its decision, but felt that an analysis of all the
relevant economic data was necessary in order to determine the
legality of the merger, and concurred after such an analysis.33
In the instant case, the Supreme Court engaged in its first full consideration of the legality of a product-extension merger. Guidelines
had previously been established for vertical and horizontal mergers,
but the narrow scope of the boundaries of legality in such mergers
has caused the business community to turn increasingly to con30. The FTC found that Clorox's expenditures, of almost $3.7 million on advertising
and $1.7 million on other promotions in 1957, to imprint the value of its bleach in the
minds of the consumer, went far to explain why it maintained such a high market
share despite the fact that its brand, though chemically indistinguishable from rival
brands, retailed at prices equal to or greater than its competitors.
31. Procter was engaged in a vigorous program of diversification into product lines
closely related to its basic products, and liquid bleach was a natural avenue for expansion. The Court found that the existence of Procter at the edge of the industry exerted.
a considerable influence on the market, since the market behavior was influenced by each.
firm's predictions of the market behavior of its real and potential competitors, and that
the barriers to entry by a firm of Procter's size and advantages were not significant..
Also, the number of potential entrants was not so large that the elimination of one would.
be significant.
32. As a multi-product producer, Procter enjoys substantial advantages in advertising
and sales promotions. It can and does feature several products in its promotions, reducing,
the printing, mailing and other costs for each product. It also purchases network programs on behalf of several products, enabling it to give each product network exposure
at a fraction of the cost per product that a single-product firm would incur. For a good
discussion of the relevancy of advertising economies as a basis for determining the legality
or illegality of a conglomerate merger, see Turner, supra note 24, at 1332-39.
33. Mr. Justice Harlan also said that the Court's opinion fails to fix standards and
leaves the FTC, lawyers and businessmen in a state of doubt as to what is to be expected
of them in future conglomerate merger cases.
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glomerates as a means of expansion.34 The lack of guidelines for

application in challenged conglomerate mergers has proved a source
of difficulty for both the Federal Trade Commission and the lower
courts. 36 By its decision in Procter,the Court has enumerated criteria
to be applied in ruling on a "product-extension" form of conglomerate

merger.37 Among the factors to be considered are the barriers to
entry that the acquisition would raise, the anticompetitive effects of

the elimination of the acquiring firm as a potential entrant, the dominance the acquired firm exerts in its product market, and the structure
of the relevant markets. However, continuing the trend established in
Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, the Court rejected the need for elaborate
proof of the probable anticompetitive effects of the merger. Thus,

the Court intimated that there was an inherent probability that the
substitution of such a powerful firm as Procter for the already dominant Clorox could only have an injurious effect on the competing

firms in the bleach industry. Yet, in dismissing the need for a fullscale examination of relevant economic data and by regarding instead
the inherent probability of anticompetitive effects, the Court failed

to establish standards as to the size of the acquiring firm, the dominance of the acquired, or the status of the market structure necessary

to invalidate a product-extension conglomerate merger. By the Court's
failure to delineate the precise boundaries of legality, considerable

uncertainty remains as to the power of the antitrust laws to invalidate
pure conglomerate mergers. 38 Considering the Court's present disposi-

tion toward fragmented markets, 39 it is perhaps possible that some of
the arguments asserted by the instant Court may be employed against

34. Comparing 1948-1953 with 1960-1964, horizontal mergers decreased from 31% to
12% of the total of 811 large mergers (acquisitions of companies with assets of
$10,000,000 or more), while vertical mergers increased from 10% to 17%, and conglomerates from 59% to 71%. A breakdown of conglomerates into three classes shows
"market-extension" mergers unchanged at 7%, "product-extension" mergers increasing
from 47% to 53%, and all others (pure conglomerates) increasing from 5% to 11%.
Whitney, Mergers, Conglomerates, and Oligopolies: A Widening of Antitrust Targets,
21 RuTcims L. REv. 187, 194 (1967).
35. The author of the FTC's exhaustive opinion in Procter later explained that the
opinion was elaborate because the Commission was aware that it was entering uncharted territory, General Foods Corp., 2 (1967 Transfer Binder) TnADE REa. Rz. I[
17, 465 (Commissioner Elman, dissenting, at ff 22,745).
36. E.g., Ekco Prods. Co. v. FTC, 347 F.2d 745 (7th Cir. 1965).
37. These factors, along with others, had been suggested by Professor Turner for
utilization in determining the validity of conglomerate mergers. Turner, supra note 24.
38. Government officials have recently hinted at more suits against conglomerate
mergers, especially product-extension mergers, while indicating a lack of power to attack
pure conglomerate mergers. Wall St. J., Oct. 20, 1967, at 1, col. 5.
39. See United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 365 n.42 (1963).
Footnote 42 reads: "if concentration is already great, the importance of preventing
slight increases in concentration and preserving the possibility of eventual deconcentration is correspondingly great." See also United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S.
270, 275 nn.10 & 11 (1966), noted in 19 VAND. L. REv. 1373 (1966).
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the pure conglomerates. Although the removal of the acquiring firm
as a potential entrant into the market would not be a relevant consideration in pure conglomerate situations, such factors as the size 40
of the acquiring firm, the dominance the acquired firm exerts in its
product market, the status of the market structure of this market and
the consequent barriers to entry that the acquisition would raise
would seem to be as relevant and material in pure conglomerate cases
as in product-extension situations. 4 '

Constitutional Law-Reapportionment-Principle of "One

Man, One Vote" Not Applicable to Appointed
County School Board Performing
Administrative Function
Plaintiffs, qualified and registered voters of Kent County, Michigan,
instituted an action for declaratory and injunctive relief' challenging
the constitutionality of a Michigan statute pertaining to the composition of county school boards. Under this statute the county board
members were chosen by delegates selected from locally elected
boards in each school district within the county, one delegate from2
each local unit participating in the selection of the county board.
Citing the gross population imbalance between the various voting
districts which possessed identical unit votes, 3 plaintiffs contended
that this method of choosing the county board violated their rights to
equal protection under the fourteenth amendment in that it failed to
40. See note 4 supra and accompanying text.
41. In General Foods Corp. v. FTC, TRADE REG. RI a. (1967 Trade Cas.) If72,268,
at 73,661 (3d Cir. Nov. 9, 1967), the Third Circuit held that the merger of General
Foods with S.O.S. was a violation of § 7 of the Clayton Act. The same factors which
were present in Procter were present in this case, with the exception that General Foods
was not a potential competitor of S.O.S.
1. The dispute arose when the streets on which plaintiffs resided were annexed to -the
city of Grand Rapids, and, as a result, plaintiffs' properties were also transferred to the
Grand Rapids school district. The school district in which plaintiffs had previously
resided then petitioned the defendant board to nullify the transfer and return these
properties to its jurisdiction. Over plaintiffs' objection, the defendant board granted
the petition. Plaintiffs asked that the court set aside certain transfers of schools from
one district to another and to enjoin the board from holding further elections until the
imbalance in misrepresentation was cured.
2. Sailors v. Board of Educ., 387 U.S. 105, 109-10 n.6 (1967). The delegate's choice
need not be responsive to the desires of the local electorate and in fact the delegate
has no way of knowing what the preferences of the local electorate are.
3. The population variance in Kent County (with each board exercising a one unit
vote) ranges from Nelson School District with a population of 99 to Grand Rapids
with a population of over 201,000.
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comply with the "one man, one vote" principle. Defendants contended

that the principle did not apply to a local administrative4 board and
that the district court could not retain jurisdiction of the complaint's
subject matter. By a divided vote a three judge court refused to

declare the statute unconstitutional and dismissed the complaint.5 On

appeal to the United States Supreme Court, held, affirmed. The prin-

ciple of "one man, one vote" is not applicable to a local governing
body 'which performs essentially administrative functions, and is
chosen by means of an essentially appointive, rather than elective
process. Sailors v. Board of Education, 387 U.S. 105 (1967).

In Baker v. Carr,6 the United States Supreme Court held the appor-

tionment of voting districts in statewide elections to be a question

justiciable in nature under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. This authority has provided the basis for various
subsequent decisions? culminating in Reynolds v. Sims8 where the
Court held that the "one man, one vote" principle is applicable to all
statewide legislative offices. However, neither Reynolds nor its progeny 9 have indicated whether the principle extends to local govern-

mental bodies. Consequently, confusion has developed in both state
and federal courts as to the propriety of extending the Reynolds

doctrine to the local level. 10 Following the Reynolds decision, the

4. Micn. STAT. ANN. § 15.3298(1) (Supp. 1965). The authority of the county
board includes: the appointment of a county school superintendent; preparation of an
annual budget and levy of taxes; distribution of delinquent taxes; furnishing consulting
or supervisory services to a constituent school district upon request; conducting cooperative education programs on behalf of constituent school districts which request such
services, and with other intermediate school districts; employment of teachers for
special education programs; establishing, at the direction of the Board of Supervisors,
a school for children in the juvenile homes; and the power to transfer areas from one
school district to another.
5. Sailors v. Board of Educ., 254 F. Supp. 17 (1966). judge Fox, in the dissenting
opinion, argued that the county board of education was a "representative" body and,
since the voting power of some voters was grossly diluted, the court could legitimately
apply the "one man, one vote" standard.
6. 369 U.S. 186 (1962), overruling Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946), which
held that voting district apportionment was a political question, and thus not a "case
or controversy" as required by U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2.
7. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963).
8. 377 U.S. 533 (1964). "[Aln individuars right to vote for state legislators is
unconstitutionally impaired when its weight is in a substantial fashion diluted when
compared with votes of citizens living in other parts of the State." Id. at 568.
9. See, e.g., Lucas v. Forty-fourth General Assembly, 377 U.S. 713 (1964); Roman
v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695 (1964); Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678 (1964); WMCA, Inc.
v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 633 (1964).
10. For cases applying the principle, see, e.g., Delozier v. Tyrone Area School Bd.,
247 F. Supp. 30 (W.D. Pa. 1965); Bianchi v. Griffing, 238 F. Supp. 997 (E.D.N.Y.
1965); vacated and remanded sub nom. Board of Supervisors v. Bianchi, 387 U.S. 97
(1967); Seaman v. Fedourich, 16 N.Y.2d 94, 209 N.E.2d 778, 262 N.Y.S.2d 444 (1965);
State ex rel. Sonnebom v. Sylvester, 26 Wis. 2d 43, 132 N.W.2d 249 (1965). Contra,
Moody v. Flowers, 256 F. Supp. 195 (M.D. Ala. 1966), vacated and remanded, 387
U.S. 97 (1967); Johnson v. Genesee County, 232 F. Supp. 567 (E.D. Mich. 1964).
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problem has been encountered by courts which have extended the
Reynolds principle. These decisions with few exceptions" have dealt
with patently legislative bodies such as city councils and county boards
of supervisors.' 2 In cases involving governmental bodies with limited
legislative powers 13 or primarily administrative 14 functions, the courts
have adopted conflicting positions regarding the application of the
Reynolds principle. An Alabama district court refused to apply the
Reynolds principle in the case of Moody v. Flowers,5 since the
Supreme Court had not as yet extended Reynolds to local governing
bodies, and held that the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment does not demand that local governmental units that have
limited powers be elected from districts which are apportioned on a
population basis. In Strickland v. Burns 6 another district court rejected the argument that the Reynolds principle does not extend to
purely administrative bodies and applied the "one man, one vote"
doctrine to a county school board, classifying it as a subordinate body
possessing powers which cannot be held as insignificant. The court
stated that the prohibition of invidious discrimination by Reynolds
is as applicable to representative governmental bodies on the local
level as to bodies on the state level.17 The court determined that there
was no basis for denying application of Reynolds to a subordinate
body simply because its powers were limited.
Courts applying the legislative-administrative distinction have not
been confronted with the argument that an appointive body, legislative in nature, is required by the constitution to be elected. Thus far
the Supreme Court has not determined whether a state may constitute
a local legislative body through the appointive as opposed to the
11. See Strickland v. Bums, 256 F. Supp. 824 (M.D. Tenn. 1966); Delozier v.
Tyrone Area School Bd., 247 F. Supp. 30 (W.D. Pa. 1965).
12. See, e.g., Ellis v. Mayor and City Council, 352 F.2d 123 (4th Cir. 1965); Bianchi
v. Griffing, 238 F. Supp. 997 (E.D.N.Y. 1965); Miller v. Board of Supervisors, 63 Cal.
2d 343, 405 P.2d 857, 46 Cal. Rptr. 617 (1965); Hanlon v. Towey, 142 N.W.2d 741
(Minn. 1966).
13. If the governing body is non-legislative in character, then it would seem that the
mandate of Reynolds would not apply, for as the Supreme Court held in that case,
"Political subdivisions of States-counties, cities, or whatever-never were and never
have been considered as sovereign entities. Rather, they have been traditionally regarded
as subordinate governmental instrumentalities created by th! State to assist in the
carrying out of state governmental functions. . . . [T]hese governmental units are
'created as convenient agencies for exercising such of the governmental powers of the
State, as may be entrusted to them,' and the 'number, nature and duration of the
powers conferred upon [them] . . . and the territory over which they shall be exercised
rests in the absolute discretion of the State."' 377 U.S. at 577.
14. Strickland v. Burns, 256 F. Supp. 824 (M.D. Tenn. 1966).
15. 256 F. Supp. 195 (M.D. Ala. 1966), vacated and remanded, 387 U.S. 97 (1967).
16. 256 F. Supp. 824 (M.D. Tenn. 1966), noted in 20 V. rN.L. REv. 649 (1967).
17. Judge Miller added that it was fruitless to pursue the elusive distinction between
administrative and legislative functions. Strickland v. Burns, 256 F. Supp. 824, 836
(M.D. Tenn. 1966) (concurring opinion).
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elective process. However, in a 1966 decision' 8 the Court emphasized
that its reapportionment cases hold only that when a state provides
for an election of a state official all voters must be treated as equally
as possible. 19
The Court in the instant case determined that the Michigan system
for selecting county school board members was "basically appointive
rather than elective." and that while the board's functions were important, they were essentially administrative rather than legislative
in the classical sense. Noting that since political subdivisions of a
state have traditionally been regarded as subordinate instrumentalities
for performing state governmental functions, the Court observed that
state governments possess vast discretion in administering these nonsovereign subdivisions. The Court further reasoned that a state may
experiment with flexible and unique municipal arrangements to enable
local governments to meet the challenge of changing urban conditions,
so long as it does not defeat any federally protected right in the
process. The Court concluded that since an election was neither
required, nor directly involved in the selection of a local board essentially administrative in character, the principle of "one man, one vote"
was inapplicable.
By the disposition of the instant case the Court provided several
sources of confusion and possible litigation. First, in view of its diverse
powers it is questionable whether the Kent County School Board
would traditionally be regarded as an administrative body. Consequently, the use of the administrative-legislative distinction appears
arbitrary, for even if the distinction is a valid one, the Court provides
no guidelines for future determinations involving similar bodies. The
arbitrary nature of this distinction is exemplified in the decision in
Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15 2 0 where the Second
Circuit interpreted the instant case as holding that all school boards
are administrative bodies, effectively excluding the "one man, one
vote" principle from the selection of local school boards.21 The administrative-legislative distinction becomes unimportant when consideration is given to the duties performed by such governmental bodies,
and the inextricable ties between these duties and the welfare of all
18. Forston v. Morris, 385 U.S. 231 (1966), where Georgia's provision for selecting
a Governor by vote of the state legislature when no candidate receives a majority of
the popular vote was held not invalid under the equal protection clause.
19. In Delozier v. Tyrone Area School Bd., 247 F. Supp. 30 (W.D. Pa. 1965), the
court admitted that the legislature could administer its school system without elective
boards, but since an elective method was utilized it must comply with fourteenth
amendment standards.
20. 379 F.2d 491 (1967).
the most common form of local governing body in the
21. The school board is,
United States, numbering over 34,000. Note, Reapportionment, 79 HAnv. L. REv. 1226,
1275 nn. 28 &29 (1966).
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the community. It is submitted that it would be preferable to give
decisive weight not to the form of selection, but rather to the substantive importance of the powers and functions possessed by a local
governing unit, balancing these factors against the value of the state's
interest in preserving the system as established. The burden would
then be on the state to justify the absence of equal protection as
guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment under the present system.
Applying this test to the situation in the instant case, it is submitted
that the importance of the duties and the potential effect on the citizenry far outweigh any utility in preserving the present procedure.

Labor Law-Union Empowered To Expel Member
for Failure To Exhaust Union Appellate Remedies
Defendant labor union expelled a member for bringing charges
before the National Labor Relations Board without first exhausting
his intra-union remedies as required by the union's constitution.' The
member then brought a second action before the Board, alleging
that his expulsion violated section 8(b) (1) (A) of the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA).2 The union contended that its action was a
lawful exercise of its right to administer its own internal affairs under
section 8(b)(1)(A) of the NLRA and section 101(a)(4) of the
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA). 3 The
1. The union member, Edwin Holder, filed intra-union charges with his local alleging
that the union had caused his employer to discriminate against him because of "certain
legally protected activity," the substance of which was not set out in the record. After
the local union dismissed the charges, Holder, ignoring his union's constitution which
provided for an appeal from decision of the trial board of the local to the General
Executive Board of the international body and which required that members exhaust all
remedies within the union before bringing an action in a court or agency, brought an
unfair labor practice proceeding before the National Labor Relations Board, alleging
the same offense. After the Board dismissed this action, Holder's local union trial board
convicted him of violating the above cited provision of the union constitution and
expelled him from the union.
2. National Labor Relations Act § 8(b)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A) (1964),
which provides:
"It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents (1) to
restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section
[7] of the title: Provided, That this paragraph shall not impair the right of a labor
organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of
membership therein ....
Section 7 of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964), confers on employees "the right
to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection,
and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities ....
3. Labor-Management Reporting & Disclosure Act of 1959, § 101(a) (4), 29 U.S.C.
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Board found the union guilty of an unfair labor practice and issued
an order requiring the member's reinstatement.4 On appeal to the
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, held, reversed. A union's
expulsion of a member for failing to exhaust his intra-union remedies
before filing an unfair labor practice charge with the National Labor
Relations Board is not an unfair labor practice under section 8(b) (1)
(A) of the NLRA. Local 22, Marine & Shipbuilding Workers v.
NLRB, 379 F.2d 702 (3rd Cir. 1967).
Section 101(a) (4) of the LMRDA prohibits unions from impeding
any member's access to a court or administrative agency, but allows
unions to require members "to exhaust reasonable hearing procedures
. . . before instituting legal or administrative proceedings . . .
Unions have contended that the proviso to this section confers on them
power to punish members who violate union rules requiring the
exhaustion of intra-union appellate procedures. One line of court
decisions has accepted this reasoning,6 emphasizing the statutes
recognition of the need to preserve a union's control over its own
affairs.7 A second group of decisions, however, places greater emphasis on the legislative intent underlying the initial sentence of
section 101(a) (4)-to protect an employee's right to bring charges
against either an employer or a union before an agency or court.
These decisions hold that the proviso to the section merely confers
discretionary power on the agency or court, rather than on the
union, to dismiss the action until the member has exhausted reasonable
intra-union remedies." Apart from section 101(a) (4) of the LMRDA,
section 8(b) (1) (A) of the NLRA, while prohibiting labor unions
from coercing members "in the exercise of rights guaranteed in section
7," allows a union to "prescribe its own rules with respect to the
acquisition or retention of membership therein . . . ." In 1964, the
§ 411(a)(4) (1964): "No labor organization shall limit the right of any member thereof
to institute an action in any court, or in a proceeding before any administrative agency

. ..Provided, That any such member may be required to exhaust reasonable hearing
procedures (but not to exceed a four-month lapse of time) within such organization,
before instituting legal or administrative proceedings against such organization . ...
4. Local 22, Marine & Shipbuilding Workers, 159 N.L.R.B. 95 (1966).
5. See note 3 suprafor relevant provisions.
6. Sheridan v. Local 626, Carpenters, 306 F.2d 152 (3rd Cir. 1962); Detroy v.
American Guild of Variety Artists, 189 F. Supp. 573 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), rev'd, 286
F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 929 (1961); cf. Thompson v. New
York Cent. R.R., 250 F. Supp. 175 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 361 F.2d 137 (2d Cir. 1966).
7. Cf. Local 283, UAW, 145 N.L.R.B. 1097, 1100 (1964); "[I]t is nonetheless
evident that internal union disciplines were not among the restraints intended to be
encompassed by [§ 8(b) (1) (A)]."
8. Detroy v. American Guild of Variety Artists, 286 F.2d 75 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
366 U.S. 929 (1961); see, e.g., Ryan v. Local 134, Elec. Workers, 361 F.2d 942 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 935 (1966); Deluhery v. Marine Cooks & Stewards
Union, 211 F. Supp. 529 (S.D. Cal. 1962).
9. See note 2 suprafor relevant provisions.
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National Labor Relations Board faced for the first time the question
of whether a union could affirmatively enforce its power under the
proviso to section 8(b) (1) (A) by fining or expelling members for
failing to exhaust intra-union procedures before bringing an action
against the union before a court or agency. 10 In Local 138, Operating
Engineers," a member, whom the union had expelled solely for failing
to exhaust his intra-union remedies, brought an unfair labor practice
action, claiming that section 8(b) (1) (A) prohibited his expulsion.
In ordering the member's reinstatement, the Board stated that for
reasons of public policy a union member's right to bring charges
against the union before the Board was guaranteed by section 7 of
the NLRA and thus protected by section 8(b) (1) (A). The Board
declared that since an employer was expressly prohibited from discriminating against employees because they brought charges,'12 a union
was prohibited
by implication from punishing its members for the
13
same reason.
The court in the instant case expressly overruled Local 138, Operating Engineers. The court found no basis for implying from
section 8(b) (1) (A) an unqualified right under section 7 to bring
charges before the Board. It noted that section 7 deals only with
rights incident to organization and bargaining and is silent as to
the right of union members to file charges. The court stated that if
a member's complaint concerns section 7 rights, he should be permitted to proceed before the Board without fear of expulsion.' 4 The
court rejected the argument that unions are impliedly included in
the provision which prohibits employers from discriminating against
10. Before 1964, unions, proceeding under the proviso to section 101(a)(4), rather
than section 8(b)(1) (A) of the NLRA, had sought to use a member's failure to
exhaust union procedures only as a defense to the member's suit, not as an affirmative
basis for penalizing the member.
11. 148 N.L.R.B. 679 (1964).
12. See National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (4) (1964).
13. Local 138, Operating Eng'rs was cited with approval in Roberts v. NLRB, 350
F.2d 427 (D.C. Cir. 1965). The court assumed "that 'the right of an employee to
file charges is protected under Section 7'" Id. at 428. Recognizing that the proviso
to section 101(a)(4) conferred power on the agency rather than on the union, the
court said: "The proviso does authorize, indeed it may require, the agency or court
to which the member comes for relief to withhold the exercise of its authority-for
four months if reasonable internal procedures are available. . . . Approval of such
restraint by agency or court is quite different, however, from freeing the Union itself
to impose a fine for failure of a member to exhaust such procedures." Id. at 430.
14. The court noted that "a section 8(b)(1)(A) unfair labor practice can be
established here by showing that rights incident to organization or bargaining were
the basis of Holder's complaint which led to union action, and in no other way." Local
22, Marine & Shipbuilding Workers v. NLRB, 379 F.2d 702., 706 (3rd Cir. 1967). Since
the record failed to reveal the basis for the original complaint, the court was unable
to affirm. The court noted that had this been the only error, it would have remanded
the case for consideration of whether section 7 rights were involved.
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a union member for bringing an action before the Board.15 Noting
that a section explicitly proscribing such union discrimination was
deleted from the NLRA before it was enacted,' 6 the court felt that it
should not replace this prohibition by construction. 17 Furthermore, the
court stated that the proviso to section 8(b) (1) (A), which allows
unions to prescribe rules in regard to the acquisition or retention of
membership, protected the union's action. The court declared that
this rule neither offends public policy nor impedes the normal administration of the Act, because it merely requires a member to give his
union a "fair opportunity to correct its own wrong;" 8 in fact, by
relieving the Board of grievances which could be settled within the
union, such a policy enhances the administration of the Act. Nor,
stated the court, does such a rule detrimentally affect a member's
right to appear before the Board; it only requires him to exhaust
reasonable union remedies first.' 9 Finally, the court noted that section
101(a) (4) of the LMRDA is consistent with the decision, because
the proviso to this section expressly confers on a union the power
to require a member to exhaust his intra-union procedures before
proceeding before the Board.20
The court's decision to prefer the policy of allowing the union to
police its own internal activities over the policy against restricting a
member's access to the Board is justified both by statutory language
and by legislative history. Section 7 of the NLFIA does not purport
to give a union member an unqualified right to sue his union, while
section 101(a) (4) of the LMRDA appears to give unions power to
require a member to exhaust his union procedures first, thus impliedly
empowering it to penalize a member's failure to do so. Furthermore,
public policy also seems to support this decision. While not unduly
limiting a member's access to the Board, this decision encourages
15. See National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4) (1964).
16. See 1 LEG. HIST. L.M.R.A. 53-54 (1948); H.R. CONF. REP'. No. 510, 80th
Cong., 1st Sess. 46 (1947), in U.S. CODE CONG. SERVIcE 1135, 1151 (1947).
17. Cf. Local 1976, Carpenters v. NLRB, 357 U.S. 93, 99-100 (1958).
18. Local 22, Marine & Shipbuilding Workers v. NLRB, 379 F.2d 702, 707 (3rd Cir.
1967).
19. In dictum, the court conceded an agency's power to evaluate the reasonableness
of the union's procedures: "Of course, a court or an administrative agency will
determine for itself whether the alleged intra-union remedy is in fact available and
whether resort to it would impose unreasonable delay or hardship upon the complainant." Id. at 707.
20. "Logically, and in normal reading, the attendant and qualifying proviso is an
exception stating what such an organization may do despite the preceding general
restriction upon its action. Moreover, there is no need for a proviso to authorize a
court or an administrative body to postpone its action until a litigant shall exhaust
intra-union remedies, since judicial and quasi-judicial bodies frequently exercise such
discretionary power to postpone their own action pending the exhaustion of other
remedies as a matter of inherent right without benefit of legislation." Local 22, Marine
& Shipbuilding Workers v. NLRB, 379 F.2d 702, 708 (3d Cir. 1967).
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democratic practices within the union and reduces the workload of the
Board by promoting settlement of disputes without litigation.21 But
it should be noted that there are dangers implicit within the instant
decision. There is no satisfactory framework for determining the
reasonableness of the union appellate procedures. Consequently, the
member must risk possible expulsion to challenge the reasonableness
of the union's remedies before the Board. This would seem to permit
the union the opportunity to impose on members unreasonable
remedies, which because of the great risk involved will go unchallenged.22 This problem could be solved by allowing a union member
to appear before a court or an agency solely to test the reasonableness
of the union's procedures without being subject to punishment by
the union. Hopefully, such a rule will be either developed in subsequent cases or enacted by legislative amendment.

Taxation-Federal Estate Taxation-State Trial Court

Judgments on Property Rights Not Conclusive on
Federal Courts Adjudicating Federal
Tax Consequences
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue denied taxpayer's estate
tax marital deduction on the ground that decedent's widow had
executed a release instrument converting her general testamentary
power of appointment into a special power of appointment1 which
does not qualify under section 2056(b) (5) of the Internal Revenue
Code.2 The executor filed a petition for redetermination in the Tax
Court of the United States and, while this case was pending, 3 brought
an action in the New York Supreme Court4 for a determination of the
21. See generally, Comment, Union Settlement of Disputes, the Rights of Members,
and the Role of the Doctrine of Exhaustion of Remedies, 9 WAYNE L. lEv. 361 (1963).
22. See Ryan v. Local 134, Elec. Workers, 361 F.2d 942 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 935 (1966).
1. Grantor created an amendable and revocable trust in 1930, the income from
which was to be paid to his wife for her life. An amendment executed in 1931 gave the
grantor's wife a general power to appoint the remainder by will, and provided for other
disposition in case of default by the grantee. Grantor's wife executed the release in
1951 to take advantage of the Powers of Appointment Act of 1951, INT. REV. CODE of
1939, § 811(f) (Now INT. 1 Ev. CODE of 1954, § 2041), and to prevent the taxation of the trust assets as part of her estate. Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 363 F.2d
1009, 1010 (2d Cir. 1966).
2. INT. Rlv. CODE of 1954, § 2056(b)(5). Together with § 2056(a), this section
allows a deduction from the gross estate for the value of an interest in property passing
from the decedent to his surviving spouse, if the spouse is entitled to all the income for
life, and alone has a power to appoint the interest in favor of herself, her estate or both.
3. The Tax Court, with petitioner's consent, abstained from making its decision pending the outcome of the state court action.
4. The petitioner was not made a party to the state action..
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validity of the release instrument. All the parties represented argued
for the invalidity of the release instrument,5 and the New York court

held that the release was a nullity.6 The Tax Court then allowed the

deduction, stating that the New York Supreme Court's decision was
"an authoritative exposition of New York law. . . ."7 The Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the Tax Court's decision.8 On
certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, held, reversed. Where
federal estate tax liability turns on property rights determined by
state law, the determination of such rights by a state trial court is not
binding on federal authorities when the United States is not a party
to the proceeding. Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456
(1967). 9
Although Congress determines what property rights or interests are

to be taxed, state law is controlling in determining the nature of these

rights and interests. 10 Even before state-determined property rights
were made the subject of federal taxation as it exists today, it was

settled law that the decisions of the highest court of a state interpreting the state property laws were binding on the federal courts. 1

The United States Supreme Court in Freulerv. Helvering 2 later determined that decisions by state courts of competent jurisdiction construing state property laws were binding on federal courts for the
federal tax consequences based on those rights, in the absence of

fraud or collusion.' 3 But the Court was careful to point out that such
state adjudications, if rendered in the absence of federal representa5. Three briefs were filed on behalf of the widow, the trustee, and an infant
beneficiary by the guardian ad litem. No argument for the validity of the release
was presented. Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 363 F.2d 1009, 1011 (2d Cir. 1966).
6. Matter of Irving Trust Co. (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Special Term, Nov. 15, 1963), cited in
363 F.2d at 1011 n.3.
7. Estate of Bosch, 43 T.C. 120, 124 (1964).
8. Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 363 F.2d 1009 (2d Cir. 1966) (Friendly, J.,
dissenting).
9. A coinpanion case, Second Nat'l Bank v. United States, 351 F.2d 489 (1965), also
involving a marital deduction under § 2056(b) (5), was decided in the Bosch opinion.
Another panel of the Second Circuit stated in dictum in that case that under no circumstances could decrees of the Connecticut Probate Court be construed as binding on a
federal court in a subsequent tax proceeding. The court based this on the facts that
Connecticut Probate Court decrees are not binding on the state's higher courts and are
even subject to collateral attack in another probate district in the state. The court
found it unnecessary to determine whether the probate court proceeding was collusive.
On certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, held, affirmed. 387 U.S. 456 (1967).
10. Helvering v. Stuart, 317 U.S. 154, 161-62 (1942); Morgan v. Commissioner, 309
U.S. 78, 80 (1940).
11. Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 5, 9-10 (1937); Spindle v. Shreve, 111 U.S.
542, 546 (1884); Nichols v. Levy, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 433, 444 (1866).
12. 291 U.S. 35, 44-45 (1934) (California decree on trustee's account was binding
for federal income tax purposes).
13. Id; see Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 5, 10 (1937) (for federal income tax
purposes, validity of assignments by petitioner, life beneficiary of Illinois trust, had
previously been determined by state appellate court).
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tion, were not res judicata. 14 The failure of the Court to develop a
definitive standard to determine conclusiveness I5 has subsequently engendered diverse determinations in the federal circuit courts. 16 The
Gallagher rule, formulated by the Third Circuit,1 7 provides that a
lower state court judgment is controlling in federal courts if it is a
final and binding adjudication of the parties' rights, even though the
judgment is the product of a non-adversary proceeding or is a consent
decree. 18 The rule is justified on the ground that the taxpayers' rights
to income or other property sought to be taxed are determined, so far
as the enjoyment of the property is concerned, in state courts whose

decisions are final and binding, and a different decision in a federal
court would not change these rights. The Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh,

and Tenth Circuits have adopted the opposite position that a lower
state court judgment is not conclusive on federal courts unless it is
the product of an adversary hearing on the merits. 19 In reaching this
position the respective circuits have used various criteria to determine
whether a state court decree is the result of a bona fide adversary
proceeding, for example, notice to interested parties, 20 oral argument
14. See Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 5 (1937).
15. "Conclusive" refers to the finality accorded a state court determination of the
rights of the parties before it, when such rights are at issue in a federal tax proceeding.'
16. A source of confusion in this area is the Court's use of the term "collusion"
without defining it. In Freuler v. Helvering, 291 U.S. 35, 45 (1934), the Court refused
to hold, at the urging of the federal government, that the proceeding in state court was
collusive "in the sense that all the parties joined in a submission of the issues and sought
a decision which would adversely affect the Government's right to additional income
tax." However, the Court failed to give a clear definition of collusion. The Court has
never decided a case in which it found "collusion" as alleged by the Government in
Freuler. Braverman & Gerson, The Conclusiveness of State Court Decrees in Federal
Tax Litigation, 17 TAx L. Rxv. 545, 551 (1962).
17. Enunciated in Gallagher v. Smith, 223 F.2d 218 (3d Cir. 1955) (consent decree
rendered by Pennsylvania orphan's court was binding on Commissioner).
18. "[W]hether the proceeding was adversary or nonadversary is not the test of
conclusiveness . . . but rather whether the judgment is an adjudication by the state
court of a property right upon which solely the federal tax is imposed, which adjudication was and is final and binding upon the parties under state law, and which was not
obtained by collusion for the purpose of defeating the tax." Gallagher v. Smith, 223
F.2d 218, 226 (3d Cir. 1955). It should be noted that the Supreme Court has neverspecifically ruled as to whether consent decrees are binding on federal courts in tax cases.
19. These circuits have adopted the definition of collusion alleged by the Government:
in Freuler v. Helvering, 291 U.S. 35 (1934), set out in note 16 supra, and have applied.
it strictly as a test of collusion. Leading cases in the respective circuits are as follows:
Old Kent Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 362 F.2d 444 (6th Cir. 1966) (replacing,
but not explicitly overruling, Goodwin's Estate v. United States, 201 F.2d 576 (6th Cir.
1953), which advocated a position near that of the Gallagherrule of the Third Circuit);
Pierpont v. Commissioner, 336 F.2d 277 (4th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 .U.S. 90&
(1965); Faulkerson's Estate v. United States, 301 F.2d 231 (7th Cir. 1962), cert.
denied, 371 U.S. 887 (1962); In re Sweet's Estate, 234 F.2d' 401 (10th Cir. 1956),
cert. denied, 352 U.S. 878 (1956); Saulsbury v. United States, 199 F.2d 578 (5th Cir.
1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 906 (1953),
20. Faulkerson's Estate v. United States, 301 F.2d 231 (7th Cir. 1962)., cert. denied,?
.
.
371 U.S. 887 (1962).
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and representation by counsel,2 ' jurisdiction of the state court, 2 and

appeal.23 The rationale adopted by these circuits is that state court
decisions should not be binding upon the federal government since it

did not have representation or a right of appeal, especially if such
proceedings were initiated solely to procure decisions adversely affecting the Government's right to additional tax.24 Variations 5 of these two
positions have been adopted in the remaining cfrcuits.1
In the instant case the Court stated that the state court proceedings
were obviously brought to preclude federal tax liability and that the

judgments could not be res judicata since the Commissioner had not

been made a party.26 The Court found that the report of the Senate
Finance Committee, which had recommended the enactment of the

marital deduction, stated that "proper regard," 27 not finality, should be
given to a state court interpretation and then only when entered by a
21. Pierpont v. Commissioner, 336 F.2d 277 (4th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S.

908 (1965).
22. Faulkerson's Estate v. United States, 301 F.2d 231 (7th Cir. 1962), cert. denied,
371 U.S. 887 (1962).
23. Apparently taking their cue from Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 5, 10 (1937)where the Court, in stating that the decision of the state court was conclusive, said that
"[ult matters not that the decision was by an intermediate appellate court"-the following circuits have determined this: Pierpont v. Commissioner, 336 F.2d 277 (4th Cir.
1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 908 (1965); Faulkerson's Estate v. Commissioner, 301
F.2d 231 (7th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 887 (1962); Kelly's Trust v. Commissioner, 168 F.2d 198 (2d Cir. 1948). The First Circuit in Channing v. Hassett,
200 F.2d 514 (1st Cir. 1952), implies that it would hold this. For criticism of this
position, see Colowick, The Binding Effect of a State Court's Decision in a Subsequent
Federal Income Tax Case, 12 TAx L. RIv. 213, 226 (1957).
24. See cases cited note 19 supra.
25. A variation of the Third Circuit position is found in the First Circuit where the
court refused to hold as conclusive an uncontested and unappealed probate court
decision arrived at subsequent to a federal district court ruling on the same matter
with which it conflicted, but it determined that it could not disregard it entirely in its
own determination of the Massachusetts law. Channing v. Hassett, 200 F.2d 514 (1st
Cir. 1952). See Third National Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 228 F.2d 772 (1st
Cir. 1956). Variations of the second position are found in the Eighth and Ninth Circuits
as follows: The Eighth Circuit does not automatically presume collusion if the state
proceeding yielded a consent judgment, but prefers to scrutinize all the circumstances
of the state court proceeding before rejecting it as binding. Peyton's Estate v. Commissioner, 323 F.2d 438 (8th Cir. 1963). The Ninth Circuit has compiled a list of
indices to determine whether or not a state court judgment is to be deemed conclusive,
among which are the nature of the right determined, whether federal authorities had
notice of the proceeding and whether its judgment appears correct. Consent decrees
are not presumed to be collusive, and the burden is on the Commissioner to produce any
evidence of collusion if it is alleged. Flitcroft v. Commissioner, 328 F.2d 449 (9th Cir.
1964). The Second Circuit gave indications that it might be grouped with this second
position in Kelly's Trust v. Commissioner, 168 F.2d 198 (2d Cir. 1948). But the court
stated in Commissioner v. Bosch, 363 F.2d 1009, 1016 (2d Cir. 1966) that whether
decisions of state trial courts are binding on federal courts in subsequent tax litigation
was an open question in the circuit.
26. The Commissioner was not made a party in either of the suits included in the
instant opinion.
27. S. REP.No. 1013, Pt. 2, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1948).
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court "in a bona fide adversary proceeding." The detailed statutory
limitations placed on the allowance of the marital deduction indicated
to the Court that Congress intended that these provisions be strictly
construed since their purpose is to eliminate tax loopholes. From this

specificity of language used both in the statute and in the committee
report the Court determined that if Congress had intended state trial
court judgments to be conclusive on federal courts in tax litigation it
would have so stated. The Court also noted that the Rules of Decision
Act,2 has been construed as a declaration that decisions of the highest
29
court of a state interpreting state law are conclusive on federal courts,

but that the decisions of lower state courts, while meriting some

weight, are not controlling.30 The Court reasoned that these principles
apply to federal tax litigation for the same reasons that they apply to
diversity cases-that "the underlying substantive rule involved is based

on state law and the State's highest court is the best authority for its
own law."31 Reversing the court of appeals, the Court held that decisions of the highest courts of the states construing state law are binding

on the federal courts, and that decisions by intermediate appellate
state courts are evidence of state law which are not to be disregarded

by federal courts unless they are convinced that that state's highest
court would rule differently. In the absence of decisions by the state's
highest court, the Court held that the federal courts are to make their
own determinations of state law, giving "proper regard" only to rele-

vant judgments entered by state trial courts in "bona fide adversary
proceedings."
In a dissenting opinion, 32 Mr. Justice Harlan, rejecting the majority's
28. U.S.C. § 1652 (1964), which provides that in the absence of federal requirements such as the Constitution or acts of Congress, the "laws of the several states .. .
shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United States,
in cases where they apply."
29. Erie R. R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Erie, a case based on diversity
jurisdiction, determined that judicial decisions of a state's highest court are to be
regarded as "the laws of ...the states" within the meaning of the Rules of Decision
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1964). Erie was silent on the effect to be given decisions by
lower state courts on questions never determined by the highest state court, because the
issue before the court had been decided by a state's highest court. However, the
reasoning of the decision, i.e., that "no clause in the Constitution purports to confer
such a power upon the federal courts," was directed not to the level of state court but
rather to the power which is reserved to the states by the Constitution, 304 U.S. at 78-80.
30. King v. Order of United Commercial Travelers of America, 333 U.S. 153 (1948).
31. 387 U.S. at 465.
32. 387 U.S. at 471. Two other dissenting opinions were written: Mr. Justice
Douglas advocated a continued adherence to Freuler v. Helvering, 291 U.S. 35 (1934),
and Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 5 (1937), holding lower state court judgments
conclusive on federal courts for their tax consequences in the absence of fraud or collusion. He dissents from the majority's view of Erie R. R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938), and cases following, on the weight to be accorded lower state court decisions
in diversity cases brought in federal courts. He states that in the diversity cases the
Court has held "that the federal court is obligated to follow the decision of a lower
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single standard as too rigid an approach, stated that the character of
both the state proceeding and the state court were relevant considerations in determining a decision's conclusiveness. Contrasting the state
interest of having its own courts determine state law so as to insure
its uniformity with the federal interest of protecting the sources of
federal revenue, he advocated a compromise. Since federal interests
are satisfied if a considered judgment of the applicable state law is
obtained, decisions rendered in genuine adversary proceedings should
be presumed conclusive. To accommodate federal interests, the taxpayer challenging the Commissioner's ruling should have the threshhold burden of showing that the state proceeding was a reasoned
resolution of competing interests, as indicated by such factors as
actual adversity of financial and other interests, presentation of reasoned argument, and appeal.
The instant case provides a standard which imposes a uniform rule
upon the previously divided circuits, and silences the controversy
over collusion and adversary adjudication. Although this substitution
of the one standard for the several would seem to be an improvement,
the rigidity of the new standard may introduce several new problems.
The new standard renders state trial court judgments subject to review
regardless of their nature. As a result, sound adversary adjudications
by state trial courts are distinguished from collusive or fraudulent
state court proceedings only by the "proper regard" they are to be
accorded in federal court. While the likelihood of collusive, nonadversary state proceedings determining federal tax liabilities is
thereby reduced, this is accomplished at the expense of downgrading
sound adversary adjudications and of increasing the frequency of
federal determination of state law. The burden on a taxpayer who
has had his rights determined in a proper, adversary state proceeding
is increased, for he must now relitigate these issues on the federal
level instead of merely demonstrating the adversary nature of th6
state proceeding. Furthermore, the possibility of conflicting interpretations of his property rights on the state and federal levels is increased, if not encouraged, ultimately impairing the uniformity of
law within each state. The effect of these inconsistent interpretations
will burden not only the individual taxpayer but also the state's
administration of its laws. The relationship between the state .and
federal judiciaries is too complex to be controlled by a single, rigid
state court in the absence of decisions of the State Supreme Court showing that the state
law is other than announced by the lower court." 387 U.S. at 466. Mr. Justice Fortas
joined Mr. Justice Harlan in his dissent, and wrote a separate opinion in which he
listed six factors, taken from Judge Raum's opinion in Estate of Bosch, 43 T.C. 120,
123-24 (1964), which would aid federal courts in determining whether a lower state
-court decision is to be accepted as conclusive on federal courts for its tax consequences.
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standard.3 A better approach may be that recommended by Mr.
Justice Harlan which recognizes the interests of both sides by taking
a flexible approach which stresses adversary adjudication of the taxpayer's property rights rather than federal adjudication of those rights.
This approach, complemented by guidelines 4 which would aid the
federal courts in recognizing sound adversary adjudications in state
courts, would have provided for a more equitable resolution of tax
liabilities and would have better served the federal system of government than the approach taken by the majority.

Taxation-Federal Income Tax-Effect of Close
Corporation Voting Trust on Right to
Subchapter S Election
Plaintiff corporation elected to be treated as a "small business corporation" pursuant to subchapter S of the Internal Revenue Code.1
Subsequent to this election, the corporation's four shareholders, in
order to achieve stability of management policy, entered into a voting
trust agreement2 giving one of the stockholders the irrevocable right to
vote all stock for ten years. The shareholders listed corporate losses
as deductions on their personal income tax returns.3 The Commissioner
disallowed these deductions on the ground that the creation of the
voting trust prevented the plaintiff corporation from qualifying under
subchapter S. The Commissioner asserted first, that the voting trust
created a separate class of stock in violation of section 1371 (a) (4),4
33. Hill, The Erie Doctrine in Bankruptcy, 66 HAav. L. 11Ev. 1013 (1953); Note,

The Competence of Federal Courts to Formulate Rules of Decision, 77 HAnv. L. REv.
1084 (1964).
34. Such as are listed in Mr. Justice Fortas' dissenting opinion, 387 U.S. at 483-84.
1. INT. REv. CODE: of 1954,

§§

1371.77.

2. As provided by Omo REv. CODE § 1701.49 (1963).
3. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 1374(b). This section provides that, "each person
who is a shareholder of an electing small business corporation at any time during
a taxable year of the corporation in which it has a net operating loss shall be allowed
as a deduction from gross income, for his taxable year in which or with which the
taxable year of the corporation ends . . . an amount equal to his portion of the
corporation's net operating loss." A shareholder's pro rata share of the corporation's
net operating loss is defined by § 1374(c) as the sum of the portions of the corporation's daily net operating loss attributable on a pro rata basis to the shares held by
him on each day of the taxable year.
4. "For purposes of this subchapter, the term 'small business corporation' means a
domestic corporation which . . . does not . . . have more than one class of stock."

The governments theory was that while the voting trust did not technically create
two classes of stock, the practical result was the same as if it had done so. By
vesting the power to vote in one shareholder, the other shareholders were stripped
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and secondly, that the voting trust was a shareholder other than an individual in violation of section 1371(a) (2). 5 On trial, the federal
district court held, plaintiff's motion for summary judgment granted.
The shareholders of a small business corporation do not forfeit a subchapter S election by the creation of a voting trust. A. & N. Furniture
& Appliance Co. v. United States, 271 F. Supp. 40 (S.D. Ohio 1967).
In 1958, Congress enacted subchapter S of the Internal Revenue
Code "to make it possible for small corporations which are essentially
partnerships to enjoy the advantages of the corporate form of organization without being made subject to possible tax disadvantages of a
corporation." 6 The purpose of the provision was to eliminate the
influence of the federal income tax in the selection of the form of
business organization which may be most desirable under the circumstances. 7 Subchapter S provides an election for small business corporations which is designed to eliminate the tax at the corporate level
and hence result in a single tax on the shareholder at his individual
rate, just as if he were a partner or proprietor engaged in a similar
business.8 Among other tax features, shareholders are entitled to
deduct from their personal income tax their proportionate share of the
of that power. The government contended that this had the effect of giving one
shareholder voting stock, while the other shareholders held non-voting stock. Thus,
the voting trust, in effect, created a two-class stock structure while retaining the form
of a single class stock structure. The Government relied on Treas. Reg. § 1.1371-1(g)
(1959) and Rev. Rul. 63-226, 1963-2 Cum. BuL. 341, to support its position.
5. "For purposes of this subchapter, the term 'small business corporation' means a
domestic corporation which . . . does not . . .have as a shareholder a person (other

than an estate) who is not an individual." The Government relied on Treas. Reg. §
1.1371-1(e) (1959) to support its contention on this point. That Regulation states:
"A corporation in which any shareholder is a corporation, trust, or partnership does
not qualify as a small business corporation. The word 'trust' as used in this paragraph
includes . . .voting trusts. Thus . . . the corporation in which such a trust is a
shareholder does not meet the qualifications of a small business corporation" for
purposes of a subehapter S election. (Emphasis added).
6. See S. REP. No. 1983, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 87 (1958). Subchapter S was
designed to make investment in corporate business more attractive by eliminating
certain onerous tax consequences of earlier Code provisions. George B. Lourie points
out that "[i]n recent years . . . the incentive of an individual to invest in a
corporate business has been severely blunted by the fact that if the business did not
prove successful, he was permitted only a capital loss in most situations. If the
business proved successful, the individual taxpayer investing in a corporate business
would be subject to full and, usually, double taxation. . . . Subehapter S .. .permits
the individual stockholder to take .. . [an ordinary] loss in the same year that it is
incurred by the corporate business. To this extent it gives a far greater incentive to
the individual taxpayer to make his corporate investment." Lourie, Subchapter S After
Six Years of Operation: An Analysis of Its Advantages and Defects, 22 J.TAx. 166,
167 (1965).
7. A provision similar to subchapter S was proposed in 1954 with the same purpose in
mind. Though not passed then, it was revived in 1958 and passed as subehapter S.
See S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 118 (1954).
8. Id.
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corporation's net operating loss. 9 Subchapter S is applicable only to
"small business corporations," defined in section 1371(a) as domestic
corporations having only one class of stock, with no more than ten
shareholders, all of whom must be United States citizens and either
individuals or the estates of former shareholders. The purpose of the
requirement that an electing corporation have only one class of stock
was to make possible a simple and uncomplicated allocation of income

and loss among shareholders. There was a desire to avoid the complex
tax accounting problems involved in passing corporate earnings

through to shareholders where the shares held were of different types
and had different rights attaching to them.10 The Treasury Regulations

provide that an agreement between stockholders which restricted the
voting rights of any stockholder, e.g., a voting trust, 1 created in effect

a second class of stock in the hands of the restricted stockholder, rendering a subchapter S election unavailable.' 2 This position has been

questioned by various writers and attacked in dictum by at least one

court. 13 As to the requirement that the shareholders be either shareholders or decedents estates, the Regulations expressly provide that
the ownership of stock by a corporation, partnership, or trust disqualifies the corporation for election. 1 4 However, there was apparently
9. See note 6 supra. For an excellent discussion of these features of subchapter S,
see generally, Strecker, When Will the Corporate Form Save Taxes?, 18 VAND. L.
REv. 1695 (1965). See also Note, Subchapter S of the 1954 Code, 33 ST. JoHiNs
L. REv. 187 (1958); Note, Stockholder Agreements and Subchapter S Corporations,
19 TAX L. R v. 391 (1964).
10. Schwartz, New Subchapter S Law Passed: Relaxed Rules Require Re-examination
of Election, 24 J. TAx. 370, 374 (1966).
11. A voting trust has been defined as a "device by which shareholders transfer
their shares to voting trustees under an agreement that the trustees shall have the
right to vote the shares for the period and in the manner stated in the agreement, the
other rights such as that to dividends to be retained by the transferors ....
"
N. LArrTN, CoRPoRAToNs 321 (1959). Treas. Reg. § 1.1371-1(e) (1959), expressed
the position that for purposes of subchapter S, a voting trust is a "shareholder" and as
such will disqualify the corporation utilizing it from election. The instant court is
the first to test the validity of this regulation.
12. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1371-1(g) (1959); Rev. Rul. 63-226, 1963-2 Cum. BULL.
341.
13. Lourie, supra note 6, at 169: "This ruling is certainly of questionable validity
and has been severely criticized by responsible tax practitioners." See also Note,
Stockholder Agreements and Subchapter S Corporations, 19 TAx L. REv. 391 (1964).
In Catalina Homes, Inc. v. Commissioner, 1964 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. ff 64,225, the court
stated: "Because of our determination of the first issue herein, it will not be necessary
for us to consider respondents contentions that (1) the shares of stock in voting
trusts constituted a second class of stock because of their loss of voting power, and
(2) the voting trusts are to be considered shareholders of petitioner so as to disqualify
it under § 1371(a)(4). However, we do deem it appropriateto note our reservations
as to whether these arguments represent a reasonable interpretation of the applicable
statutory provisions and the intent of Congress in enacting subchapter S." (Emphasis
added).
14. Treas. Reg. § 1.1371-1(e) (1959), quoted in note 5 supra. See also Catalina
Homes, Inc. v. Commissioner, 1964 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. ff 64,225.
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no prior case law on the question of whether a voting trust is a
"shareholder" other than a natural person.
In the instant case, the court reasoned from the basic premise that
the primary purpose of Congress in promulgating subchapter S was
to permit small businesses to operate in any form desired without
having to consider income tax consequences. The court declared that,
in order to prevent interference with this basic purpose of subchapter
S, the only legitimate concern of the Commissioner in this area should
be in assuring that only "small corporations" made the election that
the subchapter permitted, 15 and that only those corporations made the
election whose stock structure would permit such action without resulting in excessively burdensome tax accounting complications for
the government.16 Applying these principles to the instant case, the
court initially noted that the stock issued to the plaintiff corporation's
shareholders was all voting common stock with each share having the
same value to its respective owner as all other shares. Therefore, since
each share commanded the same proportionate amount of distributions, and accounted for the same amount of losses as it did before
the creation of the voting trust, the only real difference in stock
structure after the trust was initiated lay in the voting power of the
shareholders. 1 Deciding that a voting trust neither increased the size
of the corporation, nor created tax accounting complications, the
court dismissed the applicability of Treasury Regulation section
1.1371-1(g).18 The court stated that the Regulation was only ap15. In order to qualify for subehapter S election a corporation cannot have more
than ten shareholders and each shareholder must be an individual. INT. REv. CODE
of 1954, § 1371(a)(4). Note that "small" refers only to the number of shareholders
a corporation has, not to the amount of its assets. See note 5 supra. The court
determined that Congress meant to limit subchapter S election to such small corporations
because only small corporations were comparable to the partnership or proprietorship
where earnings can be taxed to owners rather than to the business organization. As
evidence of this intent, the court relied on Sen. Finance Comm., 83d Cong., 2d Sess.,
Report on Internal Revenue Code of 1954, in U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4752,
5096-98 (1954).
16. Id.
17. The court pointed out that the creation of the voting trust in the instant case
only achieved one of the effects which would result from an actual two-class stock
structure. That effect was the vesting of the voting power in the trustee-shareholder.
The rights of the remaining shareholders to a proportionate distribution of dividends
and/or earnings were unaffected. The shareholders were still entitled to the same
proportionate benefits from the corporation as they were before the creation of the
voting trust.
18. In pertinent part this regulation states: "A corporation having more than one
class of stock does not qualify as a small business corporation. . . . If the outstanding
shares of, stock of the corporation are not identical with respect to the rights and
interest which they convey in the control, profits, and assets of the corporation, then
the corporation is considered to have more than one class of stock. Thus a difference
as to voting rights, dividend rights, or liquidation preferences of outstanding stock
will disqualify a corporation ..
" (emphasis added). See note 4 supra.
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propriate in instances where a corporation actually issues two classes
of stock because accounting difficulties only arose where there were
actual differences in the market value of the stock.19 To accept the
Government's position on this point, declared the court, would be
to contravene the congressional intent to allow the small businessman
the freedom to choose the type of business organization he desires
without regard to tax consequences. As to the Government's contention that the voting trust created a "shareholder" other than an

individual, ° the court stated that it could "conceive of no reason why,

either technically or by implication, a voting trust should be con-

sidered a shareholder under [section] 1371(a) (2) ."21 The court noted
that 1371(a) (2) was directed toward limiting the number of share-

holders of the corporation. While recognizing that a "normal" trust
could create a type of business organization which would prohibit
a corporation from making a subchapter S election,2 the court concluded that since the trust in the instant case consisted of the
original shareholders as beneficiaries, and added no block of addi-

tional shareholders as beneficiaries of the trust who could be
considered shareholders of the plaintiff corporation, the 1371 (a) (2)

limit on the number of shareholders was not exceeded. In so holding,
19. The instant court stated that in such a situation each class of stock has a
different value to the shareholder, concerning his proportionate right to distribution
of earnings or deduction of losses. Thus, the issuance of two different classes of
stock by such a corporation would lead to accounting complications when the time
came to determine what percentage of profits or losses was allocable to the different
shares for tax purposes. The court also declared invalid Rev. Rul. 63-226, 1963-2 Cum.
BULL. 341, cited by the Government in further support of its position. In that ruling
the Commissioner held that a limited partnership which had assumed corporate form
was not qualified for a subchapter S election because, when the two limited partners
granted irrevocable proxies to the active partners to vote their stock, their action had
the effect of creating two classes of stock.
20. See IN'r. REv. CODE of 1954, § 1371(a)(2). The Government's theory on this
point was that the trustee-shareholder, in effect, had a "share" which contained all
the voting rights, while the other shareholders have non-voting shares only. Therefore,
the trust itself is a shareholder other than an individual, notwithstanding the fae that
a voting trust is not an entity capable of holding stock. The Government supports this
theory with Treas. Reg. § 1.1371-1(e) (1959). See note 5 supra.
21. 271 F. Supp. at 46.
22. The court reasoned that if a corporation were permitted to have as a shareholder
another corporation, or a "normal trust," then it could seek to evade the limitation of
only ten shareholders. In such a situation, all the shareholders of the corporationshareholder would, in effect, be shareholders of the small corporation. Thus, the
corporation would no longer be a "small" one, and no longer allowed to operate as a
proprietorship for tax purposes. In supporting its conclusion that such a sitlation
was not the case in the instant voting trust, the court distinguisted Old Virginia Brick
v. Commissioner, 367 F.2d 276 (4th Cir. 1966), involving an estate which was one of
several shareholders of a subehapter S corporation. The court there found that the
estate had become a testamentary trust because it had been held open beyond the
time necessary for its administration. Thus the corporation was disqualified as a
subchapter S corporation because in that particular case the trust had the effect of
adding shareholders beyond the limit of ten.
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the instant court struck down the application of Treasury Regulation
section 1371-1(e) to voting trusts on the ground that it was inconsistent with the intent of subchapter S.23
Given the basic purposes of Congress in enacting subchapter S and
the reasons for limiting election to corporations with less than ten
shareholders,2 4 it appears that the instant court's decision was a correct
one. As to the "second class of stock" issue, certainly, the Commissioner has a legitimate area of concern in attempting to minimize
the complexities involved in tax accounting. Where stock bears different rights as to dividends and liquidating distributions those complexities are such that the limitation of subchapter S benefits to
corporations having only one class of stock is obviously justified. It
is highly questionable, however, whether the differences in voting
rights among shareholders give rise to the sort of accounting complexities which would be a valid basis for a denial of the right to
election. The voting trust is essentially a method of business control
and, consequently, does not entail such accounting intricacies. Therefore, a difference in the voting power or control of shares should be an
insignificant factor. Control of voting rights by a trustee is not
logically related to income allocation among trustor-shareholders
since they still retain dividend rights which are unaffected by the trust
agreement and which will yield an income proportionate to the
number of shares in which the trustor-shareholders hold equitable
title. If the Commissioner's contention that voting trusts did create a
fatal second class of stock had been upheld, the instant court would
have imposed a burdensome requirement upon close corporations
since such corporations often depend upon voting trusts or other
shareholder control agreements to facilitate business management. '
However, the instant court has insured that subchapter S benefits
will be available to close corporations operating with voting trusts.
23. The court noted here that there were no cases in point on either of the two issues
presented in the case other than a dictum in Catalina Homes, Inc. v. Commissioner, 1964
P-H Tax Ct. Mem. ff 64,225. For purposes of subchapter S, the instant court stated
that "it seemed clear that Congress did not intend" that a voting trust be considered
a shareholder because the creation of a voting trust did not, and could not increase the
size of the electing corporation, nor did it create accounting complications. Thus,
said the court, to uphold Treas. Reg. § 1.1371-1(e) (1959) would be "to hold that
a tax may be imposed by regulation, which of course the law does not permit." 271
F. Supp. at 47.
24. See notes 6-8 supra and accompanying text.
25. See note 6 supra.

